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Abstract 
 
  
 The Realm of Science claims to be an autonomous entity, governed by its own rules 
and institutions.  In practice it is difficult to test the extent to which different enveloping 
political systems affect economics of basic research, as too many cultural and historical 
differences would distort such a comparison.  Unique historical circumstances make East and 
West Germany the best available ground for setting up an experiment with both experimental 
and control groups within societies and organizations. Testing the influence of socialistic 
pressure on economic performance of scientific institutions, the analysis of East German 
Academy of Sciences and West German Max Plank Society is performed.  Possessing many 
public good properties, basic research in natural sciences was supported by the government in 
both countries and was similar across the borders in its structure, goals and culture.  
Systematically comparing basic research in two institutions at its four stages of 
conceptualization, experimentation, evaluation and implementation, this paper seeks to 
identify significant qualitative influences of researcher, organizational, political and economic 
structures on the research process.  In addition to an American and German literature review, 
personal interviews with scientists and administrators of several East and West German 
research institutions are drawn upon in the analysis. Ultimately, the analysis leads to the 
rejection of the preliminary hypothesis that the research process is independent of influences 
of surrounding political and economic systems and concludes that Socialistic political system 
and central-command economy have influenced basic research process directly as well as 
through organizational structure. 
 
I.  Introduction 
Advancements in the field of natural sciences have long ceased to be the sole products 
of individual ingenuity.  The so-called invisible colleges, personal relations and 
correspondence between individual scientists in the Middle Ages have developed into tangible 
institutions and highly visible colleges supporting teams of scholars conducting both basic and 
applied research.  Economic rather than scientific differences between the two types of 
research lead to their separation into two distinct though interconnected branches. 
 Results of applied research in the natural sciences like physics and mathematics often 
take the form of inventions or innovations, which can, theoretically, be developed into 
marketable products directly.  Most of the time, applied research is profitable and returns on 
investments can be collected in the short run.  In addition, a research program of applied 
research can be planned to a large extent, like a production process, and most of the positive 
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externalities can be internalized.  It is, therefore, attractive to many industrial entrepreneurs 
who make a research divisions a part of their industrial organizations.  Today most applied 
research is conducted in the R&D departments of manufacturing and technology companies.  
This arrangement also determines the financing, internal structure, and performance of applied 
research.  In particular, Research and Development create a strong link between an economic 
system within which research is conducted and the results of this research. 
 Basic research, on the other hand, possesses many qualities of a public good.  It has a 
higher degree of uncertainty than applied research and rarely yields profits in the short run.  
Because of its uncertainty, it may not yield desired results under planned timing and financing.  
It also carries potentially large positive externalities in the form of knowledge that cannot be 
immediately applied, and would not be internalized properly by industry.  To insure an 
adequate “supply” of basic research, the government has to support pure research financially, 
either by establishing its own scientific institutions or by financing independent research 
centers.   
These basic research institutions, their organizational structure, incentive system, and 
even morale become insulated to a degree from the existing economic system, market 
conditions or lack thereof.  The above characteristics lead a young scholar like myself to test 
the degree of insulation of basic research institutions from the surrounding economic system.   
 Economic considerations cannot be ignored altogether by anyone studying scientific 
institutions.  Although the private sector in most societies may play only a minor role in the 
conduct of basic research, the public economic sector influences it directly.  Even after a role 
for the government as a modern patron of basic research is established, the vast amounts of 
required funding still raise a lot of questions.  For example, was the more than one billion 
Deutsche Marks spent for basic science in West Germany in 1986 enough and if not, has an 
increase up to 1.7 billion DM in 1993 been sufficient for conducting basic research? (vom 
Brocke, 11).  As everybody learns in elementary economics, resources are limited and any 
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government faces a problem of optimally allocating these resources.  Due to the uncertainty 
and unpredictability of basic research, it is difficult to calculate an optimal amount of funding 
for the support of science.  This problem, however, is too large to be included in full in the 
scope of this paper, and will only be mentioned briefly. 
 When financed by the government, basic research is often influenced by political goals 
of the government, such as national security.  Many people believe that only totalitarian 
regimes like the former Soviet Union have utilized science in the military purposes.  This is, 
however, a worldwide phenomenon and not a unique feature of the socialist system.  
Astrophysics research done during the Space Race, for example, was marked by pressure on 
scientists as strong in the United States as that in the former Soviet Union.  This pressure 
often took an economic form of increased funding for basic research, opening up scientific 
frontiers while pursuing strategic defense goals.  In this sense, pure research has benefited 
greatly from ultimate goals of its implementation, and vice versa -- in the long run, industry 
has benefited from basic research findings, for example in the case of nuclear power stations.  
It should be noted once again, however, that basic research findings rarely find immediate 
applications in the industry.  Short-term basic-applied research link for security purposes was 
artificial and could exist mainly due to political security priorities and additional 
governmental funding. 
 Political influence on pure science was not uniform across the borders, nor has it taken 
the same forms.  What distinguished government influence in the East from that in the West 
was mainly the scope of interference and its inertia, or inflexibility.  Both in the U.S. and the 
former Soviet Union, high security and “Red Tape” (similar to the confidential materials 
mark attached to secret documents and operations) policies were implemented in regard to 
nuclear research projects.  In the U.S. these policies covered only strategic projects, leaving 
civil research open and flexible in communication.  In the former USSR, the Red Tape policy 
was institutionalized and extended to every form of strategic and non-strategic research, 
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restricting researchers' access to information and communication among themselves at the 
national and international levels. 
 It should be noted, however, that in spite of the strong governmental control, the 
former Soviet Union had a very advanced standing in basic research, particularly in natural 
sciences.  Only since the 1970s has its scientific performance been decreasing.  The reasons 
for this decline are beyond the scope of this paper; as seen from the title, I will be writing 
about German science, but perhaps this insight would shed light on a larger picture. 
 
II.  The Hypothesis 
 To understand “what went wrong” in Soviet science one could compare it to the 
Western system and see which deviations in the organization or political pressure had the 
greatest impact on the scientific decline.  Such a comparison between any Western country 
and the USSR, though, would be fraught with difficulty, as differences in historical 
development, social system and culture are too big to ignore.  However, if it could be done, 
constructively and precisely, its use would be tremendous: by examining the corpse against a 
healthy living body we would be able to find a cure for the illness that killed the sick man, or 
in our case, the scientific sector.  Many scholars believe that socialistic ideology and central-
command economy were at the root of the problem (Menske, 7).  Using another medical 
analogy, however, removing the tumor does not necessarily make one healthy.  After a head 
tumor has been removed, an adult may be left half-paralyzed from various side effects created 
by the tumor, or by the surgery.  A doctor must, therefore, learn the full functioning of the 
organism and its interaction with the tumor to design a cure for side effects that remain after 
the tumor is removed.  Similarly, a policymaker that wants to construct a more efficient 
economic structure for basic research must first understand why has the old system broken 
down. 
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 Unfortunately, such a precise comparison between the former Soviet Union and the 
United States would be virtually impossible to conduct, as the basic unit of analysis, a 
researcher, has different culture, mentality and aspiration in the U.S., incomparable with those 
of his or her colleague in the USSR.  Instead, a comparison between scientific institutions of 
East and West Germany can be drawn.  Several assumptions would have to be made, such as 
to the “good health” of the West German science (represented by the Max Planck Society 
institutes) and poor one of the former GDR’s (State Academy of Sciences institutes).  
Comparative advancement of Western Science over Eastern supports these assumptions.  This 
economic research would require the fewest assumptions (in comparison with other possible 
pairs for such a study) as common history and culture are the variables that can be kept 
constant across the borders.  The goal of the comparison would be first of all to examine the 
in-depth operation of both systems, and then to determine the cause-and-effect path of the 
downfall of the East German science.  A virtual hypothesis (H0) is proposed: political and 
economic systems have not affected the work of the East Germany’s scientific sector by 
influencing organizational structure of research and researcher himself.  A contrary (H1) could 
then be stated: political and economic systems have negatively affected the work of the East 
Germany’s scientific sector by influencing the research process directly, bypassing researcher 
and organizational structure, the latter remaining basically the same in the 40 years of its 
existence.  I would then conduct a virtual experiment, viewing the East German institutions 
under the Soviet influence as an “experimental group” and West German institutions as a 
“control group”.  
 As with any social science experiment, however, this one would have a large degree of 
uncertainty.  In economics and econometrics, unlike in physics and chemistry, one can rarely 
determine the cause-and-effect relationship between two phenomena.  For example, the 
Phillips curve was believed to represent an unchanging inverse relationship between inflation 
and unemployment; later studies showed that it “vanished” in the 1970s and some scholars 
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believed it to be little more than coincidental statistics.  Friedrich Hayek comments on the 
theory behind the Phillips curve as “largely the product of a mistaken conception of the proper 
scientific procedure” (Hayek, 25).  Generalizing this misconception, Hayek concludes that  
  
 In economics (and in other disciplines that deal with ... “essentially complex” 
phenomena), we can obtain quantitative data for only certain aspects of the events to 
be explained, and thus necessarily limited number may not include the important 
aspects.  While in physical sciences it is generally assumed, probably with good 
reason, that any important factor that determines the observed events will itself be 
directly observable and measurable, in the study of such  “essentially complex” 
phenomena as the market, which depends on the actions of many individuals, all the 
circumstances that will determine the outcome of a process will hardly ever be fully 
known or measurable.  (Hayek, 24) 
Numerous externalities affect economic relations and cannot be disregarded in a complete 
study.  However, a thorough account of all possible side effects would distort, rather than 
complete, the picture.  All the conclusions drawn from this study, therefore, are rhetorical 
rather than factual and should not be blindly implemented in government policies towards 
scientific institutions.  
 
III.  Historical Background 
 Germany has long been known for its technological advancement both in research and 
implementation.  At the beginning of the century, however, the need for more basic research 
in the natural sciences was recognized.  To fill this vacuum, in 1911 a scientific organization 
called the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft was established.  It consisted of several basic research 
institutes, mostly in natural sciences and medicine, covering traditional and non-traditional 
areas, like corn research (KWG, 633).  In the beginning this scientific society was controlled 
by the government, but financed mostly through industry; it had strong connections with 
manufacturing companies and a large part of its research was done for production purposes.   
 In the 1920s, German industry experienced heavy losses from the hyperinflation and 
couldn't support Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft any longer.  The government took over the 
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responsibility for this, recognizing the high value of basic research done in the KWG 
institutes.  As industrial pressure was lifted from the scientists, they received greater freedom 
in choosing their research areas.  Perhaps this liberalization of science played the biggest part 
in a notable increase of inventions and innovations in Germany in the next years: this period 
in German history could be called “The Golden Twenties” not only for the general well being 
of the decade. 
 Although financial support of basic research is usually undertaken by the government, 
it should not be taken for granted that the poor, economically and socially unstable Germany 
would have supported Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft instead of dismantling and destroying it.  
The importance of this society, therefore, cannot be overestimated.  It became the major basic 
research institution in Germany.  “Neither the Academy [one of German scientific societies], 
nor institutions of higher learning [in the West Germany] ... could match the role played 
[later] by the State Academy of the GDR and perform the function of the national Academy” 
(vom Brocke, 10-11).  Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft filled the niche of performing basic 
research, and its heir, Max Planck Gesellschaft (MPG), played a role of the national academy, 
which in East Germany was delegated to the Academy of Sciences (AdW).  This functional 
similarity gives an additional reason for our comparison of the two institutions. 
 During the 1930s Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft fell under control of the Nazi Party in 
Germany; this dark period until the end of W.W.II is still barely illuminated by historians.   
During that period many renowned scientists left the country to escape the totalitarian regime 
and cruelty of the decade.  Others were forced to leave, either because of their liberal views or 
Jewish nationality.  When asked by a Nazi functionary how the mathematics institutes were 
doing since they had been relieved of Jewish members, the famed mathematician David 
Hilbert is said to have replied: “Mathematics in Goettingen?  There is none anymore.”   
Furthermore, basic research sector suffered more heavily than its applied research/industrial 
counterpart that was converted to work for Hitler's military purposes (Beyerchen, 133).  
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After World War II, the Germany was left demoralized, economically ruined and 
occupied by troops.  Furthermore, the distribution of “damages” varied across not yet existing 
border between East and West.  An East German source says that  
 
Some 70% of the industry of the former German Reich were located in the zones 
occupied by the Western powers.  The remaining 30% of industrial plant on the 
territory of the former Soviet Occupation Zone -- today the GDR -- was to 45% 
destroyed, on the average.  The extent to which production capacity was destroyed in 
constructional engineering, for example, was 70%, and in metallurgy -- 80%.  In 
contrast to this, the level of destruction of the industry located in the West German 
territory amounted on average to 20% (GDR: Science, 19) 
This statistics is apparently distorted by the Eastern propaganda, diminishing the industrial 
ruin of the West; destruction of heavy industrialized Rein region is averaged with light 
damage of non-strategic manufacture of the South-West.  East Germany, however, carried 
even greater losses in the process of military advancement and post-war dismantling for the 
spoils.  As a result, after the break-up of Germany the two states faced different resources.  
United States has helped West Germany to recover financially by the famous Marshall Plan; 
industry was revitalized quickly in what became known as the “German Miracle.”  Morally, 
however, guilt and ambiguity about the Nazi past has long plagued the country.  Surprisingly, 
it played a positive role for the development of Western fundamental research.  Thus “Nazi 
abuse of science and glorification of technology became basic tenets of postwar assessments 
of the German war effort, as well as implicit legitimization of the importance of support for 
basic research” (Beyerchen, 133).   
 Moral considerations supported the allocation of funds for basic research, when the 
country was still recovering economically.  Close to 3 trillion Deutsche Marks were spent 
between 1948 and 1955 on science and technology, of which 2.243 trillion DMs came from 
the Laenders (FRG states).  Under what has become known as Koenigstein Agreement, the 
Laenders pledged to “collaborate in the provision of the necessary funds for scientific research 
programmes of nation-wide importance, specifically, Max Planck Gesellschaft” 
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(Stifterverband, 23) The Max Planck Society was transformed from KWG, yet more than 
just a name has changed.  Several institutes in relatively less prominent fields were closed 
while new ones in interdisciplinary or specialized areas like protein research were established 
(KWG, 40-44).  Further, the main goals of the new institution were redefined and purified.  
Though MPG remained committed to conducting basic research and in many respects 
performed a role of the national academy, its scope of activities has changed.  In particular, 
the founding fathers of MPG envisioned a research institution that would fill a gap between 
universities and industry, 
 
To take up promising, new fields of research which cannot or cannot adequately be 
pursued at universities -- due either to their interdisciplinary character which does not 
fit into the organizational framework of universities, or the fact that they require 
equipment which is so expensive that it can neither be provided nor maintained by 
universities (MPG, 13). 
 In East Germany the justification for conducting basic research was politically 
stronger.  There “a flourishing state of the sciences in all fields was accordingly regarded as 
the essential condition that will lead finally towards the transition to a communist social 
system (S&T Policy, 23). “  As an immediate result of this official policy, an Academy of 
Sciences was established soon after the end of the war, in 1946.  Former KWG Institutes 
became the backbone of the Academy.  It is difficult to say to what extent goals and ethic of 
the KWG were altered in the reformation due to Soviet influence, yet it is plausible that the 
organization of research remained the same, since the Soviet Academy of Sciences originally 
took KWG as a model (vom Brocke, 15).  Therefore, whatever structural influence the Soviet 
Union might have had, it had an effect of “integrating the derivative,” imposing a similar, if 
not the same system, with the higher degree of uncertainty. 
 Additionally, other research establishments, formerly existing separately, were 
appended to the Academy of Sciences in 1950s (e.g. the Babelsberg Astronomical 
Observatory, the Geodetic Institute in Potsdam, the Astronomical computing center at 
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Babelsberg, and the Medical biological institutes at Buch).  New institutes were moreover 
founded within the Academy.  “As a result, it was given an independent research staff in 
natural and social sciences.  By 1955, it grouped no fewer than 47 institutes and working 
parties with 4,000 workers, among them 1,000 scientists” (S&T Policy, 18).  Unlike in the 
West, each new AdW institute was founded in a traditional field for advancement of already 
existing knowledge.  In the 1950's, interdisciplinary vs. traditional advancement of science 
constituted perhaps the greatest difference between the two systems spread from the roots of 
former Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft. 
 When discussing basic research, it is impossible to omit its applied counterpart, 
especially from the a dynamic perspective.  Yet after the war, the restoration of industry was a 
higher priority.  Applied research was more important for the economic survival of GDR, and 
more resources were pulled in that direction.  Proportional to the needs, there existed the 
problems facing industrial R&D: 
 
When after 1948, in the territory of the present GDR, democratic reconstruction began 
and the large industrial undertakings were nationalized, there was a complicated 
situation for the R&D institutions of industry.  Many of them had been destroyed as a 
result of the war.  There were major disproportions, because many branches of industry 
had their main centres and therefore their most important industrial research 
establishments in the western part of Germany.  Research documents available in the 
nationally owned enterprises were in many cases stolen and carried abroad, and 
numerous scientists and technologists induced to emigrate.  Extraordinary differences 
obtained as between the individual branches of industry in respect of the number of 
scientists active in these various branches.  At first it was only possible to use the 
available material to begin construction (S&T Policy, 20). 
I do not know how many resources were poured into restoring GDR's industrial R&D 
potential.  In the West, only one to five percent of the total science-allocated funds spent in 
FRG (Stifterverband, 23) went to industrial research.  In the East it is likely to have been more 
than that.  Efforts on both sides were rewarded, and rewarded quickly.  Western Europe 
praised “the German miracle” of FRG industrial revitalization, while GDR has built from 
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scratch a miraculously efficient and strong production sector comparative to the other 
countries of Socialist Block. 
 After the first years of rebuilding, both Germanys stepped on the path of balanced 
scientific development.  The number of basic research institutes and applied research 
laboratories steadily grew on both sides of the border.  Higher education improved alongside 
as new universities opened and more and more students prepared to enter all branches of 
research.  There were no excesses, like Lysenkoism in the former Soviet Union, and no major 
booms or depressions in the East German scientific life.  Research was conducted, and 
discoveries made, patents filed and new products created, though not necessarily in that linear 
order.  The period did not bring a scientific boom to East Germany, perhaps, as it was 
considered by the former Soviet Union more of a periphery, too small to have its own strong 
science.  As seen from Moscow, 
 
At present no major scientific achievement in the GDR is conceivable without the 
cooperation of the research establishments of the USSR.  As a small country the GDR 
is not in a position to advance scientific and technological progress on its own and to 
cope with the wide range of problems connected with it (USSR-GDR, 29). 
The Former Soviet Union was patronizing its “little brother”, providing for students and 
researchers' exchange, sending an East German astronaut on a Russian space mission (S&T 
Policy, 35).  The latter, however, occurred only in 1978, while general agreement on 
cooperation in science was reached as early as 1951 (USSR-GDR, 18).  Cooperation with the 
former Soviet Union, nevertheless, was fruitful in that the necessary exchange of ideas and 
information has taken place to insure development of natural sciences in GDR.  FRG 
scientists have worked closely with their colleagues from America and Western Europe; and 
yet across the Berlin Wall an intangible net of cooperation, collaboration, and ethics has 
connected scientists from all over the world. 
 The nineteen sixties passed in the same quiet manner.  Minor reforms did not change 
either AdW or MPG Institutes.  In the West, two major reforms, in 1964 and 1972, saw the 
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introduction of more democratization and employees' participation in the administrative 
decision process (Gerwin, 11-12).  These positive changes, however, did not significantly 
improve the relations or communication between the institutes or within them, as the 
hierarchical structure has remained securely in place, supported by the strong majority of 
conservative scientists (Gerwin, 12).  Some programs were introduced in the East as well, 
making just as little impact.   
 The late 1960's and early 70's, however, saw a spur of scientific activity created not by 
scientists, but administrators.  What in the East became known as “Suedenfall”, in the West 
was christened simply as gigantomania – often unjustifiable growth of research institutes, 
foundation of new ones, doubling and tripling of scientific and technical personnel.  
Simultaneously in the East, scientific planning was attempted by the government to secure 
further development: 
 
In the early 1970s two long-range schemes were drawn up at national level.  These 
were (I) the “Scheme for the development of natural sciences and technology in 
important sections of the national economy until 1990” and (II) the “Scheme for the 
long-term development of fundamental research in natural sciences and mathematics, 
as well as in selected technological directions within the range of the Academy of 
Sciences of the GDR and of the Ministry for Higher and Technical Education until 
1990”.  The purpose of these Schemes has been to chart out, for the two decades 
ahead, the main directions of research and technological development (S&T Policy, 
39). 
Both countries looked like they were preparing for the bigger challenges and major 
breakthroughs.   
 Surprisingly, the next decade brought new achievements for the applied rather than 
basic research.  Industrial laboratories and research centers were set up on a large scale in both 
East and West Germanys.  In the East they took the form of the Academy-Industry Complexes 
(Akademie-Industrie Komplexes, AIK), which conducted research for industry on “concerted 
R&D projects, for example in certain fields of medical products, of microbiology, and of 
organic polymer compounds” (S&T Policy, 47).  These complexes were seen as a link 
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between basic research and industry and, like many socialist undertakings, were built on a 
large scale.   In addition to that, the so-called construction bureaus, in effect R&D 
departments, were opened at almost every production center.  In 1977 in industry and in civil 
engineering, there were almost 130 production complexes in which more than 110,000 
employees were engaged in R&D, accounting for about 90% of the industrial potential in 
R&D (S&T Policy, 29).  In 1980s the share of R&D conducted at these production complexes 
has shrunk as more and more applied research was done at AIKs.  It is difficult to evaluate 
AIKs’ performance, as relevant statistics were most likely exaggerated for ideological reasons.  
 In the West, the so-called Science Parks were created.  Similar in purpose to Silicon 
Valley in the United States, these technological centers had nevertheless substantial 
distinctions.  First of all, Science Parks did not grow in and out of themselves, but were set up 
by the government.  As Sunman and Lowe notice, “the pattern and speed of development has 
strongly been influenced by government -- especially regional government -- policies 
(Sunman, ix)”.  Laenders have once again stepped in to increase their economic potential; this 
time through applied rather than basic scientific research.   In that, as in an initiative to create 
Science Parks, West Germany was more alike with East Germany than with the United States.  
Perhaps because of the top-down approach, Science Parks have performed rather poorly 
compared to their American prototypes, though nevertheless increasing technological 
potential.  
 Another difference between Silicon Valley and, for example, Dortmund Science Park, 
was a poor industry-university link on the German side.  While in California Stanford and 
Berkeley are quoted for their contribution to the creation of Silicon Valley (and its leading 
companies Apple, Sun, and Hewlett-Packard, to name a few), in Germany 
 
One interesting feature common to virtually all the parks is that companies usually 
expect to gain more benefit from each other, than from the associated higher 
educational institute, through the simple presence of like-minded people, to 
opportunities for sub-contracting and for undertaking joint projects (Sunman, ix). 
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The same poor link between AIKs and universities can be traced in the GDR.  Universities, 
though places of academic research, were not connected to industrial R&D labs, primarily 
because the two were governed by two different ministries. 
 Just as AIKs worked as a joint effort of the Industry and the Academy of Sciences, 
West German Science Parks often collaborated with MPGs on projects with common interest, 
for example, in biological and nuclear physics technologies (Sunman, 51).  In a general trend 
in the 1980s, applied research strongly dominated basic research conducted in MPG and 
AdW.  More and more resources from the Institutes were pulled to support Industry.  It is 
difficult to say whether this trend would have continued smoothly if Germany had not been 
reunited. 
 In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, and with it the tangible barrier separating the two parts of 
the German science.  Reunification of the scientific sector proceeded no more smoothly than 
that of the social or political sectors.  Wissenschaftsrat -- West German Scientific Council -- 
has made assessments of the performances of the AdW institutes and published a set of 
recommendations to the new unified government regarding these institutes.  Some, such as the 
laboratory for high energy research in physics in Zeuthen, were given very high ratings and 
transferred under administration of the West German institutions, such as high-energy particle 
physics DESY Lab, or saved under the so-called “Blue List” initiative (Wissenschaftsrat (a), 
52). Others were dissolved by the special commission (KAI, 32).  This, of course, created high 
unemployment among the best-educated citizens of the former GDR.  Partially to prevent a 
brain drain, and partially to utilize the new human and capital resources, MPG has extended 
its activities to the newly added eastern states and has already founded five new institutes.  It 
is still uncertain, however, whether Max-Planck-Gesellschaft would become for the new 
united Germany what Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft was for the old Germany -- the national 
academy for sciences, or whether MPG will peacefully co-exist with the transformed AdW 
(Blue List Institutes).  The goal of the new united German government is to find the most 
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effective system that would insure a smooth and efficient functioning of the German research 
institutes. 
 
V.  The Analytical framework 
 It is always difficult to say precisely what determines the performance of such a 
creative and uncertain process as scientific work.  As mentioned in the beginning, much more 
than a researcher's talent or desire for work goes into the research, but available equipment, 
access to information, and outside pressure also play their part in the outcome.  To analyze 
what determines the performance of a researcher in absolute terms would be difficult, but we 
can try to compare several sources of influence to understand which phenomena are more 
important to the research process in relative terms.   
 I start by identifying four main factors determining a research outcome.  The first one 
would naturally be a researcher himself, his talent and creativity.  The second one would be an 
internal organization structure in which a researcher must work. The third would be the extent 
of government participation (mostly for political reasons). The last factor would be the 
economic system which envelops the scientific sector and within which it operates.  Specific 
influences on the research process will be identified later; for structural purposes, they can be 
viewed as subcategories of the four main categories. 
 Each of the four factors and numerous forces placed in their respective subcategory 
affect the research process at different stages with different intensity.  I call these stages of 
research conceptualization, experimentation, interpretation, and implementation.  During the 
conceptualization stage, a scientist formulates a new idea into a hypothesis, in the second 
stage he or she tests this hypothesis either through direct experimentation or by gathering 
more materials related to the hypothesis.  In the natural sciences such as chemistry or physics, 
the second stage usually takes the form of laboratory experiments, while in mathematics it 
would include software development of computer simulations.  Various items of software are 
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also used for data analysis in laboratory experiments, but interpretation of any data or 
computer-generated data analysis is done by a scientist on the third stage of the research 
process.  Implementation, or application of results is not a part of basic research, but many 
believe it to be an integral stage of scientific process, and its examination, therefore, might 
bring valuable insights into the overall research process.         
 The two identified aspects of any research, its procedural stages and various factors 
influencing its progress can form a matrix, where interaction of different factors at different 
stages of the research process can be traced and analyzed in a Research Stages/Research 
affecting Factors Matrix (Fig 1).  Each element identified by a letter and a number refers to the 
section with a discussion on the influence of a corresponding factor on a research process 
stage.   
 
 Conceptualization Experimentation Interpretation Implementation 
Researcher A1 A2 A3 A4 
Organizational 
Structure B1 B2 B3 B4 
Political System C1 C2 C3 C4 
Economic System D1 D2 D3 D4 
Fig. 1 Research Stages/Research-affecting Factors Matrix 
 
 Ideally, an intensity of this interaction could be measured as well, but as Hayek has 
observed, such information would never be measured precisely.  I analyze the influence of the 
aforementioned factors on each step of the research process comparatively and therefore 
uncertainly, drawing information from various publications and personal interviews with the 
researchers and administrators at MPG and former AdW institutes.  The views expressed by 
each of these people are subjective, sometimes contradictory depending on their experience 
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within the system, thus adding even more uncertainty to this study.  Uncertainty deforms the 
presented structure already in the definition of subcategories of the four main factors. 
 This particular paper, for space considerations, presents only the evaluated and 
structured results of the research.  One “cell” of the evaluation matrix is presented for the 
demonstration purposes.  The full text of the research paper with the completed matrix is 
available directly from the author. 
 
VI.  Evaluation 
A1. The role of a researcher at the conceptualization stage 
 All the subcategories (vaguely) defined, I shall now examine each one in relation to the 
research process.  At the conceptualization stage, the individual mind, its creativity, 
inquisitiveness, and imagination play the crucial role in every scientific field in any country.  
Education and experience are important as necessary requirements for bringing creative 
thinking to a scientific level.  Although such intangible concepts as talent and creativity 
cannot be measured accurately at a national level, we can assume that the East and West 
Germanys due to the common history and culture contained populations with the same or very 
similar national characteristics with respect to innate abilities and inclination towards natural 
sciences (after all, forty years of socialist regime could not mutate the genes of the East 
German population).  As to acquired abilities, measured by education and experience, many 
Western observers “who by no means love the GDR... can no longer avoid the fact that the 
educational system... in the GDR [is] exemplary” (Meeting, pg. 19), although working 
experience was probably of a lower quality due to the equipment deficit in the former GDR.   I 
would conclude that, on average, the role a scientist played at the conceptualization stage of 
development was roughly the same both in East and West Germany. 
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VII. Systematization 
 Filling up the Research Stages/Research-affecting Factors Matrix alone does not show 
which one of the stated hypothesis about GDR natural sciences research are correct.  To get 
closer to the answer we would have to examine first the interaction between the Factors 
affecting Research and see their possible relationship, dependence and relative importance for 
the research process.   Instead of drawing up another matrix, I will conceptualize the entire 
research operation process in a dynamic diagram (Fig. 4) and later examine the most 
interesting links between the five main concepts as they operated in the former GDR. 
 
         
Political 
System    
Economic 
System  
       
  
      Organizational    
Structure 
 
  
       
   Researcher    
       
   Research Process    
Fig. 4  Basic Research Operation System  
Most of the links in the diagram are immediately recognizable as visual representations of the 
influences of research-affecting factors on the research process itself, discussed in the 
evaluation.  A Researcher influences the Research Process, for example, but the Political 
System acts on several levels, through Organizational Structure and the Researcher as well as 
directly influencing the Research Process.  Except three instances, arrows point only one way.  
The Researcher, his or her Research Process or Organizational Structure are relatively too 
small to have a significant influence respective Political and Economic Systems.  Possible 
influence of smoothness or quality of the Research Process on the Researcher is too 
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psychological to be measured in an economic study; therefore, an arrow pointing from the 
Research Process to the Researcher is not solid.  Another broken line connects the Economic 
System and the Researcher boxes also to show possible psychological effects. 
 The two solid lines going both ways deserve special attention.  An arrow from the 
Researcher to Organizational Structure could in theory be drawn also broken or dotted, for in 
the age of institutions a single person cannot fight an entire structure.  In the former GDR, 
though, with its personalized bureaucracy it could become more real than in the West, and 
therefore I left the arrow solid.  Interaction between Political and Economic Systems was not 
discussed before and will be touched upon later in this section to the extent that it relates to 
the operation of basic research in the former GDR. 
 A “broken” economic influence on the researcher is due to my (and perhaps everybody 
else’s) inability to measure accurately an effect of worse living conditions in the central-
command economy on a researcher.  It was perhaps the psychological pressure of constant 
food and products shortages, small apartments “issued” by the government and so on, 
especially in comparison with the Western abundance that has distracted East German 
scientists at home and affected their efforts in research.  The incentive system, which was 
placed in the organizational structure category for structural purposes (low opportunity costs, 
though being an influence of an economic system, are nevertheless part of the incentive 
system, and are consequently placed in the same organization section), has both positive and 
negative effects. Thus, in the above diagram the economic system affects a researcher through 
organizational structure (not only in the former GDR).  There remain, however, many more 
immeasurable ways in which  economic environment influences a researcher’s psyche, and for 
those a broken line is left between the two boxes. 
 The influence of a researcher on organizational structure should be examined more 
carefully.  As a group, scientific community may exert a lot of pressure, influence some 
political decisions, such as environmental protection, but will not significantly alter either 
22 
 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
political or economic structures.  Joining together in their demands, however, scientists are 
able to restructure permanently their own environment, an internal organization of their 
institutes, or found a new scientific organization like the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft.  A 
single researcher, on the other hand, will have little influence even inside his own scientific 
sphere without the support of his peers.  There are some notable exceptions to this statement.  
Professor Harnack, for example, founder of one of the Kaiser Wilhelm institutes, has 
established there a hierarchy that is still present in the Max Planck Gesellschaft institutes 
referred to previously as the Harnack-Prinzip.  Without other directors instituting the same 
system in their laboratories, however, the Prinzip would not survive longer than Harnack’s 
lifetime.  Moreover, without general trends in German society for social, political, and 
economic hierarchy outside the scientific sector, Harnack’s principle would have died out as 
well or not even been instituted in the first place. 
 Let us turn to another example briefly mentioned in the evaluation section.  I have 
claimed that the Zeuthen Laboratory performed incredibly well, according to a high rating 
from the Wissenschaftsrat especially due to the efforts of Dr. Lanius, Zeuthen’ director since 
1972.  In particular, Special Commission of the Scientific Council has noted on a high 
scientific expertise and competitiveness, and recommended further operation of the institute 
(Wissenschaftsrat (a), 54), unlike that of the Einstein Laboratory for Theoretical Physics, 
which was later dismantled.  Among difficulties that plagued Einstein Laboratory, “no access 
to Western publications, inability to attend Western conferences (though holding numerous 
invitations)” were mentioned (Wissenschaftsrat (a), 56-57).  These problems were solved to a 
larger extent in Zeuthen only by the influence of Dr. Lanius (from an interview with P. 
Soeding).  By being a good diplomat, a “trusted communist”, and a good player in the Party 
bureaucracy's corruption game, Lanius was able to get favors from his superiors, such as 
access to Western publications for Zeuthen.  Due to his efforts, approximately a quarter of 
Zeuthen scientists could go to DESY or CERN for joint projects and to attend conferences; 
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that strengthened the incentive and communication systems, two integral elements of the 
scientific organizational structure.  One can only speculate, of course, at what costs these 
favors were bought -- personal bribes, an occasional paper written by the scientist for an 
administrator to be published or presented on the Western conference.  The important thing is 
that Lanius’s efforts were rewarded.  Although he was not able to change the entire 
organizational structure of the former GDR, he has done it inside the walls of his own institute 
and that allowed Zeuthen to become a world-class research institute.  The influence of one 
person, therefore, should not be underestimated: if several other AdW’s natural science 
research institutes had had similar directors, greater freedom in communication and personnel 
mobility might have become a norm, having a significant impact on the GDR’s organizational 
structure. 
 It is important to recognize, though, that energy and able management by Dr. Lanius 
have greatly contributed to, but did not determine fully, the success of Zeuthen Institute. Many 
of the aforementioned communication features such as e-mail and an open library carrying 
both Eastern and Western publications have paved the road to success precisely because they 
were enthusiastically and extensively used, alongside with many innovations in working 
equipment (i.e. computers replacing drawing boards).  A workshop, where necessary 
equipment was often produced by scientists' craftsmanship, was probably a unique feature of 
the Zeuthen Institute (from interview with Dr. P. Soeding).  This home-made equipment gave 
Zeuthen scientists a competitive advantage over their Eastern, and sometimes Western, 
colleagues and could be considered as one of the “success-determining factors”.  Personal 
contributions of Dr. Lanius, no doubt significant, have thrived only because of hard work, 
creativity and talent of the entire Institute staff. 
 Economics and politics operate through mutual interactions, like church and state in 
the Middle Ages.  Although the latter pair was functionally separated long ago, the former is 
likely to continue its symbiotic relationship.   Interaction between politics and economics in 
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the former GDR would be a useful topic to explore, yet it lies beyond the scope of this thesis.  
S. Kornai has studied the mutual relationship between the socialistic government and central-
command economy in his extensive work The Socialist System, and I direct everybody to that 
book for further insights. 
 It may be interesting, however, to see what other scholars have added to the question 
of  politics-economics interaction particularly in relation to scientific research.  Prof. Menske 
believes that  
 
Whereas in West Germany a strongly differentiated system with functionally 
specialized and mostly autonomous institutions emerged,  East Germany science is 
characterized by hierarchical structures and the endeavor to integrate various functions.  
GDR policy was dominated by ideologically determined conceptions of a linear model 
of innovation.  This conceived of utilizing the “productive force science” especially 
along a chain from basic research to production: 
 
    
Basic  Applied   Experimental  Manufacture  Production 
Research Research Development 
  
The entire management system of the GDR was accordingly constructed in the form of 
a pyramid.   Both the economic and scientific sectors were integrated in the 
management system.  (Menske, pg.5) 
 
 This explanation contains some serious flaws.  The linear model of innovation, so 
popular after WWII both in the West and in the East, has recently been found to “distort(s) the 
reality of innovation and most serious students of innovation have no come to recognize these 
distortions.  In the linear model there are no feedback paths with the ongoing work of 
development processes” which are “essential to evaluattion of performance, to formulation of 
the next steps forward, and to assessment of competitive position” (Kline, 286).  A pyramidal 
organizational structure described by Menske, characterizing the production rather than 
innovation was present in East and West Germany, reinforced historically by the vertical 
hierarchy of the Nazi regime.  The pressure from industry on the AdW was also very weak in 
the East Germany, contrary to the Menske assessments (except in strategic research). 
25 
 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
 Despite this criticism, Menske’s argument should be taken into account.  Integration of 
the economic and scientific sectors under one all-planning management system was one of the 
main causes of rigidity of the socialistic basic research sector.  An attempt to create an 
integrated linear flow of basic research into applied and so on has failed because there is no 
natural mechanism insuring implementation of basic research results.  The latter can be 
achieved only with direct government intervention.  Basic research in natural sciences has 
another “peculiarity” -- it is hard for non-scientists (in my example, for Party apparatchiki 
occupying high administrative posts, who rarely were able scientists as well) to evaluate new 
developments in science, arising need of inter-disciplinary research, and so on.  Flexibility of 
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, on the other hand, could stem only from its autonomous position as 
a scientific society.  Rigidity of the AdW structure, an effect of the socialistic government and 
central-command economy, could in turn be a cause of the AdW’s downfall and eventual 
dismantling.    
 Let me now turn back to the stated hypotheses and use the systematic diagram as an 
evidence, or rather as the result of testing the hypotheses.  Despite a relative isolation of basic 
research in natural sciences from an enveloping political economy, H(0) does not hold: 
political and economic systems have affected research process not only directly, but through 
influence on organizational structure and on the researcher himself. The latter two were 
significantly altered by the former in the 45 years of Soviet domination.  Such a simple and 
even obvious result could nevertheless be meaningful.  In particular, it could be used to 
analyze a performance of basic research institutions in Eastern Europe and particularly in the 
former East Germany today.  After the two influencing factors -- socialistic government and 
central-command economy -- are removed from the picture, several constraints and 
disincentives, no doubt, disappear with them as well.  A distorted organizational structure, 
nevertheless, remains in place, and to a lesser extent mentality of a scientist.  Letting research 
institutes operate today as they did under old conditions would not increase their productivity 
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to the highest desired potential.  New economic and political conditions, in other words, are 
not enough; something has to be done about old institutes.   
 In the former GDR a solution was found to “cut out sick tissue and replace it with 
healthy tissue” by closing a majority of the AdW institutes and opening new MPG centers 
instead.  This solution might not have been the best in the short run, leaving thousands of 
qualified scientific personnel jobless, but in the long run it may bring its benefits.  Newly 
founded institutes, not hindered by the remnants of organizational disfunctionings would be a 
better, healthier environment for further advancement of German science. If the Blue List 
institutes -- non-closed former AdW institutes -- will not be restructured, a further comparison 
between their performance and the MPG would be possible for a better insight on which of 
the two systems has fared better.  Other Eastern European countries, however, don’t have 
alternative systems of basic research operating as the new unified Germany does.  These 
countries either have to restructure their existing systems or build entirely new ones on one of 
the Western models.  Either way, the crucial question will be one of funding.  Countries in 
transition simply will not have (now or in the near future) any money to spend on their 
scientific basic research sector, especially on restructuring.  Restructuring, however, has to be 
done, sooner or later.       
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 I began this thesis with a brief discussion of the former Soviet Union and would like to 
end it on the same subject.  The problem of funding is critical in today's Russia: 
unemployment among scientists is higher than ever, and one may point out that it is not the 
time to seek problems that existed in the past and call for restructuring.  In a few years (I hope, 
and fear that it may take decades rather than years), the transitional period will be over.  By 
then, a new democratic government would have time and resources to look at its basic 
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research sector and act to improve it.  What would be the best thing to do?  Perhaps these 
future administrators would look upon Germany for a solution, like Peter the Great had once 
done to speed up Russia’s development.   
 What would the German example show?  One of the main conclusions from studying 
the two systems, MPG and AdW, concerns the importance of autonomy in scientific 
operations.  For the best results, administrative management of basic research should be done 
from within and organizational structure should be formed according to the structural 
demands and conditions of basic research.  Another, no less important factor, would be the 
need for flexibility in the system, as most of the problems that plagued AdW basic research 
could be summarized into one word -- rigidity.  Flexibility, however, should not be imposed 
from above.  Such interference would conflict with the autonomy necessary for the most 
optimal operation of the research.  The third lesson from this analysis is the importance of 
inter-disciplinarity in basic research.  Although traditional areas still hold large scientific 
potential, the majority of discoveries are made on the edge, at the intersection of two fields 
that often grow into a field of its own, like biotechnology1.  
 The lack of inter-disciplinarity might not have been the primary reason behind East 
Germany’s poorer performance as compared with the West, but it has severily limited the 
overall scientific framework.  It is possible that even without the political restrictions that 
existed, the basic research system would have stagnated, reaching a dead end in traditional 
scientific areas.  Under the “supervision” of the Communist Party, however, day-to-day 
research processes were slowed down through communication obstacles, etc. so that the 
scientific dead end would not be reached for several decades. 
 Last but not least, the internal problem that Russian government has to face is its 
incentive structure.  Under current economic difficulties, the question of competitive salaries 
                                                 
1 Nanotechnology is just one of the examples of the field that could not be created in biology or engineering 
alone. 
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for scientists must be solved first.  Financial resources in the form of salaries, facilities and 
equipment, however, will not provide sufficient incentive alone.  The entire structure has to be 
changed.  Old incentives, i.e. ability to work or travel to the West, have disappeared as the 
Iron Curtain fell.  The newly emerged private sector on the other hand provides new 
disincentives to go into basic research as more jobs in industry are opened to scientists.  Other 
incentives for the fundamental research sector have to be created, economic as well as 
ideological.  A better system of grant and fellowship distribution is needed, perhaps through 
non-profit organizations, perhaps, once again, through the government. 
 Besides internal transformations within the scientific sector, external actions by the 
government are needed badly.  Although financial resources are hard to find at present, tax 
incentives may motivate the industry to spend more money on basic research (as mentioned, 
in the U.S. 25% of basic research is done by private sector).  This or a similar policy might 
kill two birds with one stone.  On the one hand, it will promote conduct of  basic research 
under a tight public budget; on the other hand, it will reinforce research-industry ties and lead 
to higher implementation rate of research findings.  That, in turn will lead to higher economic 
performance and larger funding for publicly-supported science.  This science and technology 
cycle is essential to bring the Russian economy forward to economic prosperity, and keep her 
there alongside other developed nations. 
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Annex A 
 
Sample questions asked on interviews with scientists and administrators of various 
research institutions in the former FRG and GDR  
 
 
Travel/Personal Mobility: 
 
How would you describe overall your connections with other scientific institutions in your 
field and in the related fields both inside and outside the former GDR?   
 
How often were your scientists invited on the national and international conferences?  How 
often did they attend?  What determined their attendance, or, rather, what prevented it -- lack 
of time or personal desire, institutional constraints or difficulties with the government 
authorization? 
 
What other means of communication existed between the scientists of your institution and 
their colleagues in other institutions nation-/world-wide,  besides conferences?  How 
restricted were those means of communication) for example, did every scientist had an access 
to a work telephone, were the calls paid for by the institute)? 
 
How easy was the access to scientific literature, especially the Western one, for the members 
of your institution?  How easy was an access to the scientific information (research reports, 
library materials) in the different departments and different national institutions for your 
researchers?  
 
 
Harnack-Printzip 
 
How much power was delegated to the director of your institution?  How much did the 
director participate in the scientific activity of the institute?  Financial?  Administrative?  How 
much “veto power” did the director had over decisions of heads of departments and separate 
laboratories?  Did all the decisions and resolutions of the institute have to be channeled 
through the director's office? 
 
How would you describe the so-called Harnack Prinzip and to what extent do you believe it 
has operated in your institution?  What do you see as major changes in the internal structure of 
your institute and why?  How would you describe the structure of your institute in terms of 
rigidity/flexibility?  What changes would you personally introduce if you were the head of the 
institute and operating under Harnack Prinzip? 
 
 
 
Institute-Industry links 
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Did you have close contacts with any of the industry branches?  Did you have any special 
contracts for basic research from the Applied Research offices of the industrial plants?  If yes, 
were there strict deadlines,  high standards and other forms of pressure felt from the industry?   
 
How well do you think your research findings were utilized by the industry? As a scientist 
conducting basic research, to what extent do you believe the goals set by the industry should 
influence the direction of basic research, and how did the industry objectives actually 
influence the mission setting at your institution?  What other forces besides the researcher's 
desire to pursue his research have influenced the choice of the research projects and 
directions?  
 
What kind of equipment do you need to conduct your research successfully? Where did this 
equipment usually come from, home or abroad? How quickly did the equipment was installed 
and exploited, and how was it maintained? 
 
 
Political Pressure 
 
Did you ever feel any kind of political pressure from your supervisors or directly from the 
authorities?  What forms did it take?  At what step of the research process do you believe this 
influence was most significant: mission setting, research process, and research 
implementation?  
 
 
Incentive/Reward Structure  
 
What do you think were the main incentives for the scientists to join your institution and 
participate actively in its activities, i.e.. moral, material.  For example, if you have this kind of 
information, what were the salaries of the junior/senior scientists, in the 1970’s -- 80’s, 
especially in comparison with the national average wage at that time.  Were there any 
additional benefits from the government provided to the members of your institute, for 
example, free housing, transportation, etc. How would be a successful scientist rewarded in 
the beginning of his career -- would his name be mentioned in the papers, would he be given a 
separate laboratory or special equipment?  What would happen to a scientist who did not 
produce any particular results?  To what extent do you believe Matthew's effect was operating 
in your institution?  What would you improve in the incentive structure to insure an even 
better performance of the German scientists?  
 
What do you think has contributed the most to your success? 
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Annex B 
 
Summary of the interview with Paul Soeding, director of Institute for High Energy 
Physics at Zeuthen, Germany (former GDR)  
 
 Zeuthen Laboratory was a successful research institute even under the socialist regime 
in former East Germany. This was due mainly to Dr. Lanius, who was the director for more 
than 25 years (1962 - 1988).  Lanius recognized the importance of communicating with the 
outside world for scientists and did everything he could to promote freedom of scientific 
information and contact within the institute (but not any political information, of course!). 
One of such achievements was the library, open to all including visitor scholars, since 
Western scientific literature usually was not available to scientists in other institutions.  Of 
course, to enter the institute one had to have an invitation, and once a member of the institute 
got into trouble because a Western scientist, hearing about his colleague's work, wanted to 
visit him at Zeuthen. 
 
        This shows that connections with the West and generally with “foreign” scientists were 
closely monitored.  Contacts not only with the West German or “capitalist world” scientists, 
but even with the Russian colleagues in Dubna were restricted.  To visit one's international 
correspondents in Dubna or DESY, Hamburg, an East German scientist (and Zeuthen 
members were no exception) had to apply for the government permission and wait at least a 
year while all his invitations and recommendations would be examined and his party loyalty 
checked.  Thanks to Lanius's influence in the party circles, where he had a very high position, 
Zeuthen had one very important mean of communication -- e-mail, which had kept it 
connected with the Western world and allowed the scientists to go along with their Western 
colleagues in the avant-garde of science.  Though it was monitored by the authorities, 
scientific information could pass freely across the borders. 
 
        Generally, all information was monitored, conversations were reported to the special 
government officials by special informants.  This created a lack of trust and collaboration 
among the members of the institute.  People wanted to free themselves from the atmosphere 
of mutual suspicion by going to DESY, Hamburg, to CERN, or to Dubna.  Mainly scientists 
could travel.  Also some engineers, occasionally also technicians.  Of those, about 2/3 were 
allowed to go to Russia or generally to the socialist countries, and 1/4 to the West for the 
prolonged periods for cooperative projects. These numbers were still considered to be very 
high among AdW natural sciences institutes. 
 
        As far as the equipment goes, it was mostly produced with Zeuthen Lab's own resources 
inside special workshops.  An exception was the computational technology, personal 
computers, for example.  Since they were underproduced in the Eastern bloc countries and 
were immediately exported to the former USSR, so the computers for Zeuthen Lab would 
have to be imported from the West.  But this was not possible for two reasons.  First, they 
would have cost hard currency that was notoriously very short, and, secondly, the better 
computers really needed for the work done at Zeuthen were all embargoed by the West.  So 
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the computers came from Russia or Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria, etc.  It took years for the 
orders to go through, and computers arrived already outdated.  
 
 Ironically, this had a positive side as well, as the scientists at Zeuthen, sick of the 
outdated technology, were more creative to designing their own software, for example, or 
embracing the new technology.  At DESY, Hambourg, for example, engineers and electronics 
designers were reluctant to switch from the old-fashioned framing boards to the computers 
with special software and had to be persuaded to this innovation.  At Zeuthen, on the other 
hand, engineers were curious and enthusiastic about working with new equipment. 
 
        Generally, there were few links with the industry, close to none, since in the short run the 
basic research performed at IfH Zeuthen was “useless”.  However, there was enormous 
pressure work hard and show good results, because otherwise the institute would be in danger 
to be closed for its “uselessness”. 
 
        Director's efforts, as we have seen, have kept the institute afloat and quite successful.  
The director was not omnipotent, however: he could not fire a person, for example, but all the 
financial, scientific, and administrative papers had to go through his office and further up the 
bureaucratic ladder.  Director had his own Academy and Party bosses in front of whom he was 
answerable.  But, contrary to the opinion, there was in some respects less bureaucracy in the 
East than in the West Germany, because some of the decisions were made by inter-personal 
deliberations rather than through administrative routine. 
 
        Still, due to his position and strong Harnack-Prinzip retained in the system mainly 
because it was favorable to the hierarchical structure of the socialist administration, a director 
had a lot of power and could do almost anything inside his institute, as shown in the example 
with the libraries.  For that, of course, he had to be a good diplomat, like Lanius was, and he 
had to have very good friends in the high echelons of the Socialist Party. 
 
  Though people have changed, the internal structure had remained basically the same 
until 1989.  But one part of the internal structure had deteriorated greatly, that is, the incentive 
structure.  Though Zeuthen Lab research was successful, it could have been three times as 
successful, was it done in the West. There are many reasons for this.  Foremost, it was a lack 
of freedom, free scientific exchange, the whole depressing atmosphere of a country run by a 
party system repressing individual freedom and initiative; second, lack of resources (i.e. 
computers), and in general a lack of a good industrial basis. Many people wasted their 
valuable time designing and building things that in the West one simply buys. Even primitive 
materials were often hard to come by. People also wasted infinite time waiting for deliveries, 
searching for sources, etc. Third, progress was pronounced to be for the sake of advancing the 
socialist doctrine as defined by the party, and people knew that it was all lies and hypocrisy 
and corruption, and they became extremely frustrated.  
 
 Frustrated and disenchanted, many scientists did not make an effort to work harder 
than necessary, especially since they were not materially awarded for extra efforts.  Junior 
researchers received significantly less then the factory worker, and only a half of what his 
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director would get.  The only prize for hard work would be the recognition of the senior staff 
and the possibility to travel abroad to Dubna or Hamburg on their recommendation.  Even that 
required political obedience or at least lip service as well, at least as far as traveling to the 
West was concerned.  Possibility to work in the atmosphere of relative trust was an award in 
itself, to escape the frozen society, though to work in the West a scientist had to leave his 
family back home as an insurance of his eventual return.  But there were many scientists who 
for political reasons were not allowed to exit the country and they finally lost the little 
incentive there was to work hard.  There always remained, of course, the few scientists who 
worked for the science itself, and they were always the ones to conquer the new frontiers in 
their field. 
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Annex C 
 
Summary of the interview with Leo Stodolsky, scientist at Max Planck Institute for 
Physics at Munich, Germany (former FRG) 
 
 MPP (Max Planck Institute for Physics) is a theoretical and experimental basic 
research institute, mostly publicly funded.  It is one of the leading research centers in the 
scientific world.  Its members are often invited to the conferences and for collaboration 
projects in other institutes, such as DESY, Hamburg, and CERN, Geneva.  Even before 1989 
MPP had contacts with other research institutions in the East.  Its scientists went to DUBNA, 
Moscow, and Yerevan,  had regular meetings in Krakow  and participated in occasional 
formal collaborations etc., particularly with Krakow.  There was no pressure from the Western 
authorities to restrict East-West scientific contacts. 
 
        With the Western  partners scientific communication and exchange was well established.  
Since early 80s the institute has received Internet access and gradually all the scientists had e-
mail, telephones were available, though not long distance in every office.  Duration of 
international calls was monitored because of the costs, but it was nevertheless allowed to call 
international for scientific purposes.  The same financial limitations allowed a senior scientist 
to attend a conference only about three times a year (without any restrictions to the location.) 
 
 The library was full with scientific journals (including translated major Russian 
publications) and open to everybody within the institute and visitors. It was quite easy to enter 
the institute and use the library for the outsiders, they just had to register with the secretariat.  
For research facilitation, a copy machine was available in the library. 
 
        Despite strong connections with the scientific world, MPP had little links to the industry, 
because basic research performed there had none or close to none immediate applications.  
Under “basic research” are meant not only theoretical findings, but also experimental 
research. The institute had strong experimental groups and a big workshop that took up most 
of the budget and about 2/3 of the scientific personnel. 
  
       Once a project was approved it was generally well supported.  Influential directors, 
however, could get better support for their projects.  Directors had a lot of power also due to a 
strong influence of the Harnack principle.  A director could not fire a person, of course, 
because of the strong union and government. regulations, but short of that he could do 
everything within his institute, and all the papers went through his office.  The “Betriebsrat” 
[work council] approval was necessary for personnel decisions, but usually it does not 
influence them.  In that sense, and in many others the internal structure has remained the same 
and little has changed during 60's -- 90s. 
 
        Political pressure was almost non-existent, even though some influence could be exerted 
by individuals who wanted to implement their political opinions, i.e. against nuclear research.  
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Government did not set any goals or monitored any project; however, sometimes it contracted 
institutes to participate in a specific project with government monitoring and supervision. 
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Annex D 
 
 
Summary of the interview with Leon Mishanaevsky, scientist at MPA Institute for 
Metallurgy at Stuttgart, Germany (former FRG)  
 
 Materialprufungsanstalt (MPA) is an applied metal research institute.  It has strong 
links with the industry and often receives industrial orders.  It is, therefore, only partially 
funded by the government and receives most of its operational revenue from industrial orders.  
There was no strong connection wit the government and no political pressure was felt. 
 
 Relationship with the industry has taken a form of traditional meetings once every four 
months.  Researchers read their papers, their colleagues in business in turn express their 
desires as to the direction/ betterment of further research, and in this discussion a plan for the 
next few months is worked out. 
 
 Deadlines are strict, “do it or die.”  If the job is not done in time, penalties would be 
imposed by the ordering company on the institute, and the scientist at fault would get 
punished by his or her superiors.  This is an incentive system that takes a form of stick rather 
than carrot.  Carrots would be director’s recognition, salary raise, etc. 
 
Harnack Prinzip still operates on a high level -- inside the MPA there is a strict hierarchy.  
Director is quite strong and has a lot of power.  He is not omnipotent and does not have a 
“veto power” over heads of laboratories, but his word carries the heaviest weight in any 
decision. 
 
 A working atmosphere is easy and relaxing (to an extent that people would not slack 
off).  During lunch an entire team would sit down to chat about outside things, but hierarchy 
would be so strong that nobody would stand up and leave before the team head.  
 
 In terms of equipment there never were any problems.  Scientists perform mainly 
computations and simulations on their work stations.  Equipment is either home industry-
produced or foreign-made in U.S. or Japan. 
 
 In general research done at the MPA is very good, but it is not utilized fully by the 
industry. 
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